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Abstract 
The middle-income trap (MIT) describes a situation faced by countries at a relatively mature stage of development 
that often poses an obstacle to sustainable long-term growth. The MIT is characterized by declining factor 
productivity from the exhaustion of labor-intensive, import and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) based strategies 
when middle-income status is achieved. In this paper we focus on the MIT and Poland. In the past two decades, 
Poland experienced steady growth based largely on imported technologies and low-cost labor. Recently that 
economic growth has slowed, prompting economists to ask whether Poland is experiencing an MIT. To answer 
this question, we analyze changes in investment in Poland – specifically its growth and composition – as well as 
savings, FDI, educational attainments of the labor force, development of new technologies and products, the role 
of imports, diversification of exports, and product complexity. We also examine the development of modern 
infrastructure, institutions (including legal environment) and demographic changes in Poland that support growth. 
Our findings indicate that certain factors consistent with the MIT are gaining importance in Poland and that those 
factors represent a challenge to Poland's future growth rate. 
 
Keywords: Middle-Income Trap, Total Factor Productivity Growth 		
1. Introduction 
 
The middle-income trap (MIT) refers to a condition faced by countries at a relatively mature stage of development 
that often creates obstacles to sustainable long-term growth. The MIT is typically characterized by declining factor 
productivity from the exhaustion of labor-intensive, import and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) based strategies 
when middle-income status is achieved. In this paper we focus on conditions associated with the MIT focusing on 
Poland's economy. Poland's is selected for this analysis because it has experienced steady growth based largely on 
imported technologies and low-cost labor in the last two decades. Recently that economic growth has become 
more erratic, prompting economists to ask whether Poland is experiencing an MIT. To answer this question, we 
analyze changes several factors supporting growth: investment – specifically its growth and composition – as well 
as savings, FDI, educational attainments of the labor force, development of new technologies and products, the 
role of imports, diversification of exports, and product complexity. Aside from factors that are quantifiable, we 
also examine the development of modern infrastructure, institutions (including legal environment) and 
demographic changes in Poland that support growth. Our findings indicate that certain factors consistent with the 
MIT are gaining importance in Poland and that those factors might challenge to Poland's future growth rate. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
The concept of the middle-income trap (MIT) is relatively new and spurred some controversy in the literature. 
Analyzed first at length by the World Bank in the context of selected Asian economies’ slowdowns focused mainly 
on their limited macroeconomic conversion problems (Gill, et al. 2007).  Since then, literature expanded rapidly, 
including new versions of definition, causes, and policies preventing its occurrence.  The attempts to define MIT 
can be condensed into two, not necessarily mutually exclusive groups: one focusing on statistical evidence 
indicating slowdown in macroeconomic measures of growth and development; the other one identifying economic 
slowdowns connected with the lack of structural and institutional reforms necessary for a country to progress past 
the middle-income stage of development. Generally, the MIT is associated with a relatively sustained economic 
slowdown based on systemic reasons, preventing income conversion to the level of the most developed economies.  
The term ‘trap’ resembles Nelson’s 1956 “low-level equilibrium trap”, though it was originally applied to diverse 
low-income countries unable accelerate their growth (Nelson 1956). The actual income at which the trap occurs, 
the specific decline in growth rate, as well as time involved are not well defined in the literature (Griffith 2011). 
However, as disputes regarding systemic problems of middle-income countries are common, most researchers 
agree that if a country found itself in an MIT, its per capita income levels would be in the ‘teens’ of thousands of 
dollars (Eichengreen 2011). 
 
The discrepancies in definitions and characteristics of the MIT are further exacerbated by structural factors and 
changes among the countries that are potentially threatened by the MIT.  In fact, it is easier to identify countries 
outside of the MIT threat: at the low GDP/capital level are those that have not yet reached that level of modern 
development and those that passed the danger of an MIT. The first category includes slow-growing developing 
economies that rely on low-skill labor-intensive production, natural resources, foreign capital supplementing low 
domestic savings and low diversification of exports (Baumol 1967). The second group includes most developed 
countries, with an accumulated stock of physical and human capital, rising total factor productivity, high-skill 
labor and capital-intensive production, are generating their own technologies and innovation, and have income 
exceeding $20,000 per capita (Shahid et al. 2009).  
 
Despite discrepancies related to the exact characteristics, the MIT seems to be a real threat for some countries 
(Rostow, 1990). For example, Brazil – following its strong economic performance in the 1950s through the 1970s 
– remains stuck at the income level attained in the early 1980s. In over two last decades, Brazil experienced slow 
productivity growth, limited export diversification and weak or declining institutional progress, as indicated by its 
Gini coefficient, governance and corruption indices (World Bank Annual Report 2015) The post 2009 slowdown 
in Chinese growth, accelerated in 2016-17 also fostered extensive research on whether China is likely to experience 
its own MIT and on factors that might contribute to it (Zhang 2017).  
 
Table I generally summarizes selected characteristics of progression in growth. It ranges from low income at the 
left to the most advanced level of development at the right. Based on general characteristics cited by literature, an 
MIT is likely to occur between stages III and IV (Rostow 1990).  	
I. Reliance on 
subsistence 
agriculture, aid 
dependency 
II. Introduction of 
simple 
manufacturing 
involving foreign 
capital 
III. Complex 
manufacturing/continues 
reliance of foreign capital  
IV. Quick 
absorption of 
foreign management 
and technology; 
starting to produce 
and develop own 
goods  
V. Reliance on own 
innovation, product 
design; global 
leader in many 
products 
 
1.  low growth in per 
capita income  
1. moderate growth 
of per capita income 
2. moderate 
structural change  
1. rising growth of per 
capita income 
2. moderate structural 
change 
1. fast structural 
change 
2.shift of the 
employment share 
from the 
1. steadily increase 
TFP growth 
2. high capital and 
technology content 
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2. agricultural 
employment 
exceeding 80% 
3. government driven 
industrialization, 
wide use of subsidies 
4. limited structural 
change 
 
3. increase of labor 
outside of 
agriculture 
4. infrastructure 
build up 
3. increase of labor 
outside of agriculture 
4. formation of domestic 
service industry (outside 
of traditional services) 
 
agricultural to the 
industry and 
services 
3.increased labor 
productivity and 
participation 
of production and 
exports 
 
Rwanda, Ghana Vietnam Thailand Malaysia 
 
Korea, Taiwan US, Japan, most of 
the EU 
 
Table 1. Major Stages of Economic Growth and Development 
Source  Rostow, 1990  
 
In the early stages of development, an economy can generate growth by specializing in labor-intensive and low-
wage production, and importing or imitating technologies from more advanced countries. Over time, a shift from 
stage I to II of economic development is associated with the reallocation of capital and workforce from the 
agricultural sector to the more productive industry or service sectors. This shift is often supported by the inflow of 
foreign capital and active governments supporting industrialization.  With appropriate institutional adjustments 
and policies, inflow of capital, rise in savings and productivity, countries tend to move to stage III. It is roughly at 
this stage that the MIT challenge may arise as countries try to shift from an extensive growth, relying on existing 
comparative advantages concentrating mostly in labor to increasing total factor productivity and developing new 
technology and innovation-based growth engines (Porter 2002). 
 
The purpose of focusing on a potential MIT stems from the recognition of unique challenges faced by countries at 
the third stage of development and from a necessary shift in policies and sources of growth to avoid a potential 
MIT. Thus, while the MIT may not be clearly defined and lacks strong empirical evidence for it being a systemic 
problem, it is useful as a concept for guiding policy discussions.   
 
3. Some reasons responsible for MIT 
 
The major factor behind the MIT is the need for changing role of factors that support growth in low-income 
countries who have achieved middle-income status. Reliance on labor-intensive processes, imported technologies 
and foreign investment becomes less viable as growth pushes domestic prices and wages upward. Thus, it becomes 
necessary to increase productivity of labor and/or capital and to create modern economies that rely on rising total 
factor productivity, development of new technologies and innovation. In the following section, we explore changes 
in some of the factors which threaten a country's sustained growth and movement to higher stages of development 
(in Table I, from stage III to stages IV and V). 
 
While searching for potential causes of an MIT and a country’s inability to move to sustainable modern 
development literature focuses on declining total factor productivities (Fernando 2017), other factors are often 
considered in the literature: slow growth and composition of investment (particularly where previous high and 
unsustainable investment rates are not supported by domestic savings (Hayat 2014),  extensive reliance on FDI in 
funding domestic investment, lack of rising educational attainments of labor force (Leibfritz 2008), failure to 
develop domestically new technologies and products, reliance on imported capital and technology-intensive goods 
(Zakia 2007), insufficient R&D, lack of diversification of exports, and limited product complexity. In addition, 
slow development of modern infrastructure, weak institutions (including legal environment), and unfavorable 
demographics tend to exacerbate the growth problem (Douglass 1989). 
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4. Poland’s case study  
   
 Poland has recently been a subject of literature focusing on sources of growth and its sustainable, (Radwan 2014). 
Following its transition to a market economy in the 1990s, Poland has often been viewed as a model of growth, 
and was the only country maintaining positive growth rates amid the global recession. However, Table II shows 
us that, after the recession ended, Poland’s growth has fluctuated and tended to decline. The average rate of growth 
from 2001 to 2008 was 4.1%, but it declined to 2.9% during 2009 to 2016. Such decline alone is not alarming and 
must have been partially associated with the global recession, but it becomes more problematic when it coincides 
with existence of systemic factors that may contribute to the MIT. Although the time frame examined is too short 
to provide definite trends, and Poland’s economic slowdown does not necessarily imply any systemic threats, we 
will examine changes in some economic factors associated with a potential MIT to assess its likelihood. 		
year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
growth 1.2 1.3 3.7 5.6 3.4 5.8 6.6 4.8 1.7 3.8 4.4 2 1.3 3.3 3.7 3.1 
prod/hr, 
$ 
14.4 15.7 16.5 17.8 18.1 19.1 20.3 21.4 22.7 22.5 27.5 28.8 29.9 30.4 31.2 32.0 
I 90.5 82.1 83.5 87.5 94.2 108 126 138 149 154 168 164 156 166 173 175 
VA 101 103 106 112 116 123 132 138 142 147 154 157 160 165 171 176 
X 103 108 123 129 142 164 181 193 182 206 222 232 246 263 283 308 
I/GDP 20.6 18.4 18.8 20.2 19.2 21.7 25.2 24.6 20.6 21.3 22.4 21.0 19.0 20.4 205 19.6 
Ed 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 
R&D 0.62 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.60 0.66 0.72 0.75 0.88 0.97 0.94 1.00  
Pate 22.3 21.8 16.1 20.4 27.6 29.4 41.3 38.0 40.3 36.0 51.6 48.0 60.8 64.7 62.5 66.7 
L 61.5 62.2 62.9 63.4 64.0 64.2 64.4 64.5 64.5 64.4 64.2 63.9 63.4 63.0 62.4 61.9 
Lprod 73.4 77.4 80.9 84.0 85.4 87.8 90.1 90.8 93.7 100 105 107 108 112 113  
FDI 5283 3991 2897 2750 2223 4027 2689 6696 3799 3181 2424   9900 12200  	
Table 2. Changes in Poland’s Major Indicators in the Period 1999 to 2016 
Sources: own calculations based on: CIA Country Factbook, OECD Statistics and Rocznik Statystyczny GUS 
Wskazniki Makroekonomiczne.  
 
Indicators are as follows: (1) growth: percentage growth rate of GDP (2) prod/hr, $: total factor productivity per 
hour in dollars (3) I: investment index, year 2000=100 (4) VA: value-added index, year 2000=100 (5) X: exports 
index, year 2000=100 (6) I/GDP: share of investment in GDP (7) Ed: number of graduates with tertiary degrees 
outside of arts and sciences per 1000 (8) R&D/GDP: share of Research & Development in GDP (9) Pate: Number 
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of patents/1000 (10) L: percent of population age 18-64 (11) Lprod: GDP per hour worked index, year 2000=100 
(12) FDI: total FDI in million Euros  
 
The high and rising share of public investment results from Poland’s reliance on the EU funding designated 
primarily for large capital-intensive projects, such as infrastructure (highways), environment-friendly transport 
(railways, public transport), projects related to investment in broadband internet access, and development of 
renewable energy sources. The EU funding is usually transferred to various levels of government responsible for 
infrastructure and is classified as public investment.  Throughout most of 2008 to 2015, Poland was among the top 
three largest recipients of EU funds, reaching first place in 2013 with over $20 billion in funding for domestic 
investment. However, the absorption of those funds has often been problematic, threatening its future inflows and 
is blamed for the recent cuts in such EU funding (Szymański 2017).  
 
Figure 1. Poland's Share of Investment in GDP 
 
Source: own calculation based on Rocznik Statystyczny GUS Wskazniki Makroekonomiczne various years. 
 
A The high share and reliance on public investment funded by the EU is so far the strongest concern when 
considering sustained growth and a possibility of Poland succumbing to an MIT. To successfully move to modern, 
sustainable development a country needs to facilitate private sector growth and investment. Even though 
construction of modern infrastructure, which is necessary to support modern growth, typically relies largely on 
public funding, low and declining share of private investment could be a sign of concern. However, given the 
relatively short time period examined and major global macroeconomic decline occurring during that time period, 
further analysis of trends and factors affecting private investment is needed to assess whether investment 
composition and its changes are likely to contribute to a systemic slowdown. 
 
Another factor potentially contributing to an MIT is rooted in education (Jimenez, 2012). Here Poland has been 
making steady progress, as evidenced by the number of people with tertiary degrees outside of arts and sciences 
(Ed), which increased 2.6-fold in the examined period. When comparing Poland’s overall share of population with 
tertiary degrees – which was 28% in 2015 – to other OECD countries, we see that it is on par with Germany, and 
exceeds those of Hungary, Portugal, Italy and the Czech Republic. This heavy investment in human capital should 
be definitely helpful in sustainable growth and development, consequently diminishing the threat of the MIT.   
 
An additional factor often examined when analyzing signs of an MIT is innovation. Measuring the role of 
innovation in growth is typically problematic, but we can rely on two proxies: the share of Research and 
Development (R&D) in GDP and the number of patents granted per 1000 people (Pate). Poland’s GDP share of 
spending on R&D has been increasing throughout the entire period, though it remains the lowest among the 
European OECD countries, hovering around 1% of GDP. The equivalent numbers for Germany, Hungary, 
Portugal, Italy and Czech Republic are 2.9, 1.4, 1.3, 1.3 and 2% of GDP, respectively.  
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The other proxy used to measure innovation and the modernization of economic engines of growth is the number 
of patents granted per 1000 people. This number increased in Poland from 22.5 to 66.7 in the 2000 to 2016 period. 
However, according to the World Intellectual Property Organization, Poland still ranks 20th in filings for 
intellectual property protection rights, behind most European countries at a similar level of development (Khan, 
2016). The low number of patent applications is consistent with Poland’s low spending on R&D and could be 
partially due to limited government funding for private innovation. 
 
Two more factors that sometimes contribute to economic stagnation are an aging labor force and a consequent 
rising dependence of the elderly on the working population. In Poland, however, the share of working-age 
population remained over 60% throughout the examined period, peaking in 2008-2009 and declining slightly 
afterwards. While examining related data, we stumble upon labor participation rate, which followed an inverse 
trend to average population age – peaking at 57% in 1999 and falling to 53% in 2007, only to recover to 56.3% in 
2016 – and does not appear to cause immediate MIT concerns (Trading Economics, 2017).  Another popular 
measure is the dependency rate, which reveals the number of dependents, ages up to 14 and over 65, to the total 
population. Poland's dependency rate is 43.8% (IndexMundi, 2017), which is lower than Germany (51.62%), 
Czech Republic (49.52%) and Hungary (47.91%), indicating that a higher percentage of labor is working age and 
thereby a lesser strain on the state budget (IndexMundi 2016). Although, this short trend might be reversed because 
in 2015 Poland reduced the retirement age to below 65, which is below the retirement age in most EU countries. 
However, due to currently limited data it is hard to support a hypothesis that Poland’s demographics constitute an 
immediate systemic threat to its economic growth.  
 
Another major engine of economic growth is exports. To attain modern sustainable growth a country needs to 
switch from labor-intensive exports and or exports relying on FDI and imported technology to capital and 
technology-intensive products, based on domestic innovation. Between 2000 and 2016 Poland's exports both 
tripled and experienced a change in structure. In 2016 the following ten categories dominated Poland's exports: 
machinery (including computers) (13.1% of total exports), vehicles (12.2%), electrical machinery and equipment 
(11.5%), furniture (6%), plastics (4.7%), articles of iron or steel (3%), mineral fuels including oil (2.6%) and meat 
(2.2%) (Workman, 2017). In 2004 Poland's exports were also dominated by machinery and equipment (21.9%), 
followed by metals and semi-finished metal products (12.57%), minerals (5.73%), plastics and rubber products 
(5.14%), chemicals (5.06%), textiles (4.9%), food and tobacco products (3.73%), and wood and paper products 
(3.21%) (Exports/Imports, 2017). 
 
These are highly aggregated categories and therefore it is difficult to determine the extent of value added generated 
by skilled labor or technology in those exports, which is necessary in the long run to avoid an MIT. However, 
some structural changes in Poland's export composition are worth noting: in 2016, the largest categories of Poland's 
exports included computers and vehicles, which were absent in 2004. This itself is not necessarily a sign of higher 
innovation content in Poland's exports; in fact, EU firms frequently rely on Poland's less expensive labor to produce 
their vehicles and other machinery. However, there are some indications that Poland's exports have become more 
advanced and contain higher value added. For example, metals and semi-finished metal products, minerals, and 
textiles, all of which are typical low value-added exports, were absent from 2016's top ten exports; and these low 
value-added exports have been replaced by a higher share of equipment and machinery, indicating an increase in 
Poland's sophistication of exports. Nevertheless, Poland's current exports still rely highly on foreign capital and 
technology, so such a shift from textiles, minerals and food products to more technology-based exports does not 
necessarily protect Poland from an MIT. 
 
Further examination of Poland’s FDI structure sheds only limited light onto the extent of modernization and 
reliance on domestic versus foreign innovation in Polish production. When comparing changes in accumulated 
stock of FDI in Poland between 2005 and 2015, we see that the total share of FDI in Poland’s GDP increased from 
24% to 40% (Ancyparowicz, 2009). Throughout the entire period manufacturing, transportation equipment, and 
food processing were the most attractive locations for foreign capital. By 2015 however, services – whose 
development is necessary to facilitate modern growth – gained a larger share in FDI, particularly through financial 
intermediaries (19%) and commerce (16%). Like the changing export structure, the changing FDI composition 
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indicates that Poland has not quite moved to Table I’s stage IV of development and remains dependent on foreign 
capital for technology while providing cheaper manufacturing opportunities.   
 
5. Policy Implications 
 
Based on Poland’s rapid growth and development in the last two decades, the question often considered is whether 
current engines of growth will continuously support transformation to a modern sustainable economy. While there 
are some signs of a macroeconomic slowdown, it is unclear if they result from systemic causes considered in the 
literature as typical triggers responsible for the MIT. On the positive side, some of the factors examined indicate 
a lack of systemic threats commonly associated with an MIT. Most importantly, Poland’s productivity, as 
measured by total factor productivity and GDP growth per hour, does not reveal any signs of a slowdown. Also 
related to modern growth are data on Poland’s education, which show a rapid increase in the share of those with 
tertiary degrees. As for population, both the dependency ratio and data on aging support modern growth needs. 
 
A more problematic picture emerges when analyzing investment. The high and rising share of public investment 
financed through EU infrastructure funds is helping to build a modern economy. Since this investment is vital to 
modern development, Poland needs to address frequent criticism from Brussels about its limited absorption of 
funds (Kersan-Škabić, 2017). Some changes that could increase absorption include changes in Poland’s 
institutional and regulatory framework involved in the absorption process. On the legal side, simplification of 
public procurement rules, elimination of the need for a ministerial-level regulation for all documents, and 
elimination of court appeals for all bids (for example, for those under a 100,000 Euro) could help the absorption 
process. On the financial side, absorption could improve by simplifying the process of refund claims. 
 
However, assuming Poland will continue improving and building modern infrastructure, it also needs to increase 
the share of private investment. This may require more business-friendly regulation, streamlining business 
registration procedures, and monitoring the impact of the recent reform of insolvency law. In addition, restrictive 
labor laws and irregular work relationships often hamper small and medium-size business investment and growth, 
undermine labor productivity, and often prevent firms from hiring new workers (OECD, 2016). 
 
Related to factors of labor contributing to an MIT is the potential impact of the recent change in Poland’s retirement 
age, which was lowered to 60 for women and 65 for men, reversing an increase to 67 approved in 2012 by the 
former government. While it is too early to find its impact statistically, this policy will definitely harm Poland’s 
future dependency ratios and may impact growth, particularly as the number of retirees increases (most of whom 
rely exclusively on the state for their pensions).  
 
Poland’s current spending on R&D also raises some concerns because it indicates a limited role of government in 
that area. While the government is highly involved in investment, private innovation and technology hardly rely 
on public spending.  Experiences of countries that successfully moved to a modern stage of development all 
demonstrate that government-funded R&D is critical to support this process, particularly in areas where high costs 
and risks are involved in producing technological advances.  
 
Changes in Poland’s foreign trade structure indicate a shift from manufacturing low value-added exports to more 
advanced products, but it appears that both exports and FDI still rely on relatively lower labor costs to produce 
goods based on imported technologies. This implies that a shift to a modern growth based on domestic technologies 
and innovation has yet to occur. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The existence of the MIT and systemic factors that contribute to it are still debated in the literature, and the mixed 
results obtained upon examining those factors in Poland reinforce deepen the controversy. While most factors that 
tend to inhibit economic growth, and shifts to modern stages of development are absent in Poland, some potential 
threats have been identified in the process of the analysis. The key elements include the low share and slow growth 
of private investment, declining absorption of the EU funds, limited spending on R&D, and an expected rise in 
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dependency rates. If left unaddressed, those factors alone will likely hamper Poland’s economic growth and 
development.  
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